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Pastoral and agro-pastoral areas in eastern Africa and elsewhere on the continent have long been 
regarded as peripheries, especially in economic terms, but also in terms of social and cultural 
accomplishments. Although biased perceptions of the ‘unproductive’ uses of pastoralism have 
become outdated, government policies still do little to formally recognise or integrate pastoral lands 
as critical parts of rural livelihood systems and economic development models. Instead, many 
states give preference to large-scale agricultural investments in pastoral areas, resulting in the loss 
or fragmentation of rangelands, induced sedentarisation of pastoralists, and a radical reduction in 
livestock numbers. The Lands of the Future Research Network supports the view that alienation of 
pastoralists from productive lands often is unwarranted, unproductive, and unadvisable. In such 
cases it would be better for the overall economy and society to leave things as they are, or, if 
‘development’ comes in, to discuss the development potential of pastoralism. In other cases of 
integrated economies, combining old and new forms (‘mixed agriculture’ on a societal scale) might 
offer advantages to all groups of participants as well as the national economy. Drawing on research 
from Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Tanzania our paper looks at the significance of pastoralism as a 
productive economy and the positive bearing it has on the environment, wildlife conservation, and 
on the health and well-being of pastoral communities. The paper also reflects on what is at stake 
when one form of land use is replaced by another and when customary rules and practices 
regarding land access, land use, and traditional law are not fully recognised by policy makers. 
Using historical examples (e.g. from Afar) and current development trends (e.g. Ethiopia’s river 
basin development in the Omo Valley), the paper shows how the impacts of such development 
need not be negative (e.g. forced displacement, resettlement, conflict). The authors urge 
development planners and governments to integrate the expertise of agro-pastoralists into 
development models and to establish strong relationships between investors, NGOs, GOs, policy 
makers, researchers, local communities, and other stakeholders in order to find equitable and long-
term solutions for changing land uses. 
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Pastoralists throughout the world are facing times of turbulent transition. In the past decade, global 
economic trends have increasingly become investment reality in pastoralists’ territories. Changing 
land use patterns and disturbances to the environment and livelihoods of pastoralists are obvious in 
areas like eastern Africa, which is home to one of the largest concentrations of (nomadic, 
transhumant, and agro-) pastoralists in the world. Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, who live 
in these emerging areas of investment and who engage in subsistence economies within larger 
socio-economic networks, are and will continue to be significantly affected by large-scale 
commercial investments, both domestic and foreign, by resettlement schemes and by the increasing 
changes in land holding and land use within their territories, whether externally or internally 
induced.  
Governments, politicians, and local communities; NGOs and human rights organisations, 
activists, investors, and investment brokers; as well as scholars from different disciplines represent 
divergent voices concerning the implications of investments within pastoral territories. More often 
than not, these voices seem irreconcilable. The Lands of the Future Research Network wants to 
join efforts and to search for solutions where conflicts of interest occur, above all, to prevent 
serious conflict scenarios that would arise when divergent interests harden into opposing fronts. 
Since many pastoral regions, such as in Asia (cf. IIED 2013a on China), have already undergone 
problematic change and transformation, the Lands of the Future Research Network will view the 
problems and challenges in eastern Africa on a comparative basis.3 
 
Pastoral Land Use and Policy 
 
The productive use of rangelands through “mobile livestock husbandry has long defined the most 
effective strategy for extracting value out of otherwise marginal lands, and in so doing feeding 
growing millions” (Galaty 2013: 152f). Yet, in the past decade the most valuable pastoral lands 
have become subject to large-scale agricultural investment, resulting in the loss or fragmentation of 
rangelands, induced sedentarisation of pastoralists, and a radical reduction in livestock numbers. 
Where the richest rangeland areas are withdrawn from the store of resources accessed by 
pastoralists for dry season grazing, in favour of cultivation, the overall productivity of the land may 
even decline, pastoralists having little say regarding alternative land uses. With many governments 
in East Africa claiming a state monopoly on land, more needs to be done to assure the rights and 
resources of pastoralists as partners in the new development ventures and to make better informed 
choices as to the best long-term use of their lands. 
First, there is the elementary issue of the rights, both customary and statutory, of (agro-) 
pastoralists in Africa to be economically active and politically recognised citizens of their own 
countries. In their introduction to Pastoralism and Development in Africa: dynamic change at the 
                                                            
3 During a workshop called Lands of the Future at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle/Saale, 
Germany on March 4–5, 2013, prominent anthropologists were invited to discuss the future of pastoralism in Africa. This 
workshop resulted in the creation of the Lands of the Future Research Network (LOF), which addresses some of the 
pressing issues related to the adaptation and transformation of pastoral peoples to large-scale land acquisitions and other 
forms of investment in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas of eastern Africa. The Lands of the Future Network – open to 
scholars and practitioners from all disciplines – aims to raise levels of pertinent knowledge about pastoralism within 
changing economies and contends that neither pastoralists nor ‘friends of pastoralism’ are standing in the way of 
development, but are valuable partners in the process. 
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margins, Catley et al. (2013: 6, 21) point to the new policy framework of the African Union (AU), 
which stresses the rights of pastoralists, including the right of access to spatially distributed 
resources, and the urgency of maintaining and enhancing pastoral mobility as a time-tried strategy 
to attain efficient use of grazing resources while avoiding environmental degradation (see also 
Schlee 2010 for a review of the AU’s policy). The Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa 
(African Union 2010) is one of the most remarkable examples of a policy document that counters 
the long-standing anti-pastoralist bias in Africa by recognising their crucial contributions to 
regional food systems, social support systems, ecosystems, and trade.  
In Ethiopia, for instance, regional states with a high proportion of pastoralists, such as the Afar 
Regional State, have started to develop their own land policies, which to some extent take the needs 
of pastoralists into account (Abebe and Solomon 2013: 189ff). Some, however, remain sceptical of 
the outcome of this process. In the chapter, The Need to Strengthen Land Laws in Ethiopia and to 
Protect Pastoral Rights, Abebe and Solomon note that:  
 
“While the 1994 constitution of Ethiopia includes a provision guaranteeing that pastoralists 
are not [to be] displaced from rangelands, other provisions in existing federal policy and law 
reaffirm the powers of the state to expropriate land in pastoral areas for development.” 
(Abebe and Solomon 2013: 193)4  
 
This means that modern transformations of arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs), the resource base of 
rural pastoralists, often occur through legal frameworks that continue to deny local communities 
their historical, customary rights to land, and/or proper compensation for lost land or land use 
changes. In fact, many state policies do little to formally recognise or integrate pastoral lands as 
critical parts of rural livelihood systems and economic development models. Instead, most 
governments still regard the lands of pastoralists as ‘idle’, ‘degraded’, or ‘unproductive’ and 
therefore in need of ‘development’ by local and foreign investors. As this paper shows, however, 
such anti-pastoralist biases have become outdated. While indeed there are signs of change toward 
more pro-pastoralist policies, it would be in the best interest of states to take seriously the moral 
and political considerations that drive such change, as well as the sound economic (Schlee 2013) 
and ecological reasons (cf. Notenbaert et al. 2012) for doing so. 
 
Pastoralism as a Productive Economy 
 
There is an emerging consensus among scholars and practitioners dealing with range management 
and livestock production systems that, for immense areas in Africa and in ASALs in other parts of 
the old world, dry belt food production can only take the form of mobile livestock production 
(Schlee 2013; for a global overview, see Khazanov and Schlee 2012). Catley et al. (2013: 7) note 
that in 2010 the value of pastoral livestock and meat trade approached one billion USD for the 
Horn of Africa alone. They provide examples showing that “the livestock trade networks emerging 
from pastoralist areas of the Horn are so massive that Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia can be 
categorized as ‘high export’ countries” and that pastoralists “have adapted to, rather than ignored, 
market demands and opportunities” not only reacting to the increasing demand for meat in their 
respective countries but on the international market (Catley et al. 2013: 6ff; McPeak and Little 
2006; Little 2014). Mahmoud’s work on camel trade in northern Kenya examined the vibrant camel 
                                                            
4 See for instance Articles 40.5 and 41.8 of the Constitution. 
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marketing activities in the northern Kenyan/southern Ethiopian borderlands (Mahmoud 2013). 
Focusing on the Moyale market on the Kenyan/Ethiopian border, Mahmoud’s study describes how 
herders and traders respond to emerging market opportunities in dynamic and innovative ways. 
Pastoralist innovation is key to risk mitigation and survival in an uncertain environment and most 
importantly to livelihood improvement (see also Scoones and Adwera 2009; Mahmoud 2006, 
2013). The emergence of an increased demand for camels and camel meat in Arab countries and 
the overwhelming response from pastoral communities in the wider region to participate in that 
trade supports the premise of an on-going pastoral innovation in livestock marketing with the 
potential to transform the livestock-based economy with direct benefits to local herders.  
Alongside the crucial importance of livestock production for both the national economy and local 
livelihoods, the significance of livestock in maintaining social relations, exchange networks, and 
cultural survival is a sociological feature of stability that also remains unacknowledged in most 
government policies (Homewood et al. 2012: 16).  
It should not be forgotten that pastoralist systems in eastern Africa and elsewhere on the 
continent are largely agro-pastoralist, and that they are already significantly connected to networks 
of local exchange and trade, and to local agrarian cultivation systems (see, e.g. Gabbert 2012: 19ff; 
Workneh 2011). Thus, simply taking pastoralist areas “out of production” and dedicating them 
solely to other uses – of which the long-term socio-economic outcomes are significantly 
unpredictable – would undermine the agricultural-pastoral synergies that enhance both the value 
and benefits of each through complementary land use (Schlee 2013). This and similar points are 
convincingly made by Behnke and Kerven Counting the Costs: replacing pastoralism with 
irrigated agriculture in the Awash Valley (2013a), John Galaty Land Grabbing in the Eastern 
African Rangelands (2013), and Mustafa Babiker Mobile Pastoralism and Land Grabbing in the 
Sudan: impacts and responses (2013) in the recent volume by Catley, Lind and Scoones (2013). As 
they and others argue, there are sound economic reasons for viewing anti-pastoralist policies and 
calls for “the end of pastoralism” as misguided, counterproductive, and obsolete (Schlee 2013; 
IIED 2013b). 
Behnke’s and Kerven’s findings for the Awash Valley show, for example, that state-owned, 
large-scale, irrigated cotton or sugar cane production yields lower returns per hectare than would 
the gross value of animal husbandry (live animals, meat, and milk) carried out by pastoralists, not 
even counting the loss of surfaces suitable for any kind of crop or fodder production due to forms 
of irrigation that lead to increased soil salinity. They show “with reasonable certainty that 
pastoralism can be either economically comparable or more advantageous than either cotton or 
sugar cane cultivation” (Behnke and Kerven 2013b: 10). Projections of revenues under different 
forms of land use in Loliondo District in northern Tanzania (TNRF 2011), for example, show that 
per hectare revenues from livestock sales based on extensive pastoral production compare 
favourably to those from alternative uses, including tourist revenues from the Serengeti National 
Park, hunting concessions, and photo safaris (Galaty 2013: 148f). To some extent, except for park 
revenues, these other uses need not exclude pastoralism, because, with a bit more good will and 
organisation, wildlife, tourism, and extensive pastoralism can be made to coexist and the income 
from various activities combined when calculating the potential productivity of a region.  
Babiker (2013) does not give figures comparing the income derived from the transition to 
mechanised crop production with the losses that this process entails to pastoral production in the 
Sudan, but his discussion of the negative impact that this transition has on pastoralists and the 
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wider society makes it likely that, for the overall economy, the corresponding losses caused by this 
kind of development exceed the gains – or at least diminish them considerably. The costs include 
the following: hostility between pastoralists and large-scale farmers (a ‘security’ issue, which, like 
all such issues, also has a financial side); decline of the remaining, congested rangelands; high 
costs of supplementary fodder, a factor that squeezes out owners of small herds; and intensive 
litigation about ‘trespassing’, caused by the expansion of agriculture into long-established but no 
longer properly enforced livestock corridors, which, after having been reduced from grazing areas 
to mere routes, are now often blocked completely by cultivated fields (Babiker 2013: 181f). With 
unintended irony, one of Babiker’s sources speaks of “the encroachment of herding on croplands”, 
while historically the encroachment has, of course, happened the other way round (ibid:. 179). This 
encroachment continues today in East Africa. In Sudan, it has strongly contributed to the 
devastating civil war in Darfur since 2003, at a huge human and economic cost (Prunier 2009). In 
many areas of eastern Africa pastoral lands are increasingly threatened by the hasty, large-scale 
land acquisitions for commercial purposes, causing biodiversity loss and putting food security at 
risk. Costs of the new mega-farms often also appear to be much higher than anticipated and profit 
margins somewhat disappointing (for biofuels, cotton, and maize), due to insufficient feasibility 
studies on soil quality, water needs, and other environmental aspects. Some projects have already 
been significantly scaled down and led to government policy adjustments. 5  In Tanzania and 
Ethiopia, for instance, the rush by foreign investors to secure land, ostensibly for agricultural 
production, though in fact for no purposes beyond hoarding and speculation, has led the 
government to threaten re-nationalisation of land left idle.6  
 
Pastoralism and the Environment 
 
In addition to its direct contribution to market economies, pastoralism plays an essential role in the 
protection of biodiversity and local food security. Pastoralists have an intimate knowledge about 
their environment, which contributes in significant ways, for example, to the protection of 
grasslands, trees, and forests/bushlands, which are integral to the pastoral economy and the basis 
for much of the diet of pastoralists (Notenbaert et al. 2012). Something often overlooked by policy 
makers is the critical contribution that forest and bushland foods and resources make to the food 
portfolio of pastoralists. The nutritional value of forest and bush flora is substantial among many 
herding communities. For instance, among the Mursi, agro-pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, over 
50 wild leaf varieties provide an excellent source of vitamins A and C, protein, calcium, and iron. 
Fruits, such as berries, and forest plants, such as roots, are also used for their important medicinal 
properties (LaTosky 2013). Other examples are the food intake patterns of the Bodi, Me’en, Dizi, 
Suri, Nyangatom, and Kara peoples. Neighbouring, more agricultural people like the Ari also use 
such forest and bush resources. Given the importance of forest areas (e.g. the riverine forests) to the 
pastoral economy, many researchers and NGOs are urging governments and development partners 
to increase investments while also engaging pastoral people in support of sustainable forest 
management and the rehabilitation of degraded forest lands (Sunderland et al. 2013; see also Daniel 
and Aregai 2010).  
                                                            
5 See: Aman Sethi, Karuturi Debacle Prompts Ethiopia to Review Land Policy, The Hindu (India), June 1, 2013. 
6 See: Daily News Reporter, Develop it or Give it Back, Idle Land Hoarders Told, Daily News (Tanzania), October 8, 
2013. 
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A considerable body of ecological research in arid and semi-arid areas in eastern Africa shows 
that the extensive land use practices of pastoralists also have a major bearing on the conservation of 
savannah wildlife populations and ecosystems (Nelson 2012; Homewood et al. 2012). 
Sustainability aspects enter the picture here. Given the overall ecological compatibility between the 
livestock of pastoralists and wild large mammals, pastoralism is not only critical for maintaining 
forest areas, but also wildlife populations and the savannah lands they inhabit (ibid., see also 
Homewood and Rogers 1991). Nelson has pointed out that  
 
“(…) 65% of Kenya’s wildlife is today found on community and private lands, with only 
10% in national parks and about 25% of that accounted for by the Maasai Mara National 
Reserve alone (Western et al. 2009a). In other words, pastoralists and other landholders host 
the majority of Kenya’s wildlife populations, sustaining these key assets in the national 
tourism industry (Norton-Griffiths 2007).” (Nelson 2012: 7) 
 
Pastoralist land management practices not only have implications for the protection of biodiversity, 
but for regional and national economies as well. In northern Tanzania alone, “the annual value of 
pastoralist land uses to the wildlife-based tourism industry is estimated at approximately US $83.5 
million” (Nelson 2012: 1). Policy objectives should thus support the mutual benefits between 
pastoralism, biodiversity, and wildlife conservation. 
 
From Local Pastures to Global Markets 
 
Pastoral areas in eastern Africa have long been regarded as peripheries not only in economic terms: 
power holders in the centres have also often failed to acknowledge the distinct forms of land use, 
knowledge, and cultural accomplishments of the groups living in those territories (Markakis 2011: 
7; see also Schlee with Shongolo 2012; Abbink 2002: 157; Dereje 2013; Girke 2013). For people 
living in the periphery of the expanding Abyssinian empire and British colonies, it was politically 
and economically more viable to rely on their direct neighbourhood networks. In contrast, the 
current impact and behaviour of unfamiliar national or global actors, such as the state, missionaries, 
NGOs, and international entrepreneurs, who are increasingly interested in pastoral areas, reflect 
vast asymmetrical power relations.  
The relations of local populations to national and international investors pose an additional 
challenge, as the politics, economies, and fates of people, who have never met, are merged through 
globalised market dynamics rather than through human encounters. Investors often have never 
visited the territories their companies invest or work in, yet their presence can have a significant 
impact on people’s lives, raising questions about the future of these new encounters: How can these 
‘virtual neighbours’ develop understanding, knowledge, and respect for each other? What efforts 
are made to create face-to-face relations with each other in spite of the spatial distance of national 
and multinational planning offices to the grass root level? How do corporate policies enable or 
encourage managers and migrant workers on farms to build relationships with local communities? 
And how can investments in agriculture take account of existing land tenure and livelihood systems 
and practices that will be affected by changing land use? 
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The concept of “global neighbourhood” (Gabbert 2013)7 provides methodological and analytical 
tools to approach challenges and conflicts of investment on pastoral land in a realistic manner. 
While extreme positions often characterise the present discourse about investments, especially 
about large-scale land acquisitions, the underlying principles set out for a functioning cultural 
neighbourhood (Gabbert and Thubauville 2010), such as effort, time, interest, communication, 
respect, and mutual knowledge, help us to understand that conflict induced by new encounters in a 
changing global environment is almost inevitable. Realists would contend that it cannot be 
otherwise, because without a history of communication, contact, and exchange there must be a lack 
of mutual knowledge between new neighbours, which is partly caused by the limited time the two 
parties have to get to know each other. This leads to the ‘Other’ appearing unpredictable to both 
sides, followed by misunderstandings and misbehaviour that exacerbate the inherent potential for 
conflict, e.g. between local populations and farm employees, resulting in higher risks and costs for 
all parties.  
With an increasing pace, national and global newcomers on pastoral territory, e.g. investors and 
migrant workers for emerging enterprises, come with their own missions and interests to regionally 
defined cultural neighbourhoods, while often initially lacking the knowledge about (and interest in) 
their counterpart’s cultures, economies, and ways of communication. Varied socio-economic 
realities, levels of expertise, and perceptions on land use – not only between new neighbours but 
also within communities and enterprises – make it impossible to apply normative approaches to 
these encounters (Evers 2012). The quality of the developing relationship between neighbours, far 
or distant, will therefore always depend on the time, effort, and creativity invested in learning from 
obstacles to reach mutual understanding and respect. In a globalised era, where space and time are 
compressed by fast communication, fast transportation, and fast markets (Harvey 1989), where 
neighbours do not necessarily have to meet in person, the investment of time as a highly valued 
asset, before and during an investment project is essential to measure efforts that aim at greater 
food security locally and globally.8 A plea for considerate timing is not to be mistaken for attempts 
to halt necessary investment in agriculture and national food security, but to slow down hasty 
calculations that promise short-term rewards from agricultural investments that cannot possibly be 
sustainable. Realistic approaches to improving food security also take into account that benefits 
cannot be expected to automatically follow from generalised economic development projects that 
might indeed lead to demonstrable impoverishment of local populations. If too many mistakes are 
made during initial project phases this might hinder its success in the long run and instead generate 
denial or even resistance. Therefore, the thoroughness and integrity of environmental and social 
impact assessments (ESIA), and planning and action based on these, will determine the quality of a 
cooperative approach to development and investment that can (or cannot) be carried out with 
recognition and support by all stakeholders (Gabbert 2013). 
 
                                                            
7 Articles which are based on the presentations of Gabbert, Strecker and Tewolde and Fana at the 2013 conference “Large 
Scale Agricultural Investments in Pastoral Lowlands of the Horn of Africa: Implications for Minority Rights and Pastoral 
Conflicts” at the IPSS (Institute for Peace and Security Studies), Addis Ababa University, mentioned in this paper, will 
be published in the conference proceedings.  
8 “Assessment according to economic returns creates pressure for investment professionals to maximise profit to the 
detriment of other considerations (…).” (IIED 2012: 3) 
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Customary Land Use and Pastoral Land Rights  
 
Indigenous communities are self-sufficient in making productive use of forests and rangelands for 
their own subsistence, while often contributing to regional markets, but for this they must have 
secure access to critical resources. The importance of land in pastoralist and other indigenous 
communities for purposes beyond subsistence has been well noted in anthropological literature as 
well as in global policy documents. The UN Human Rights Committee, for instance, has stated 
that, “(…) To enjoy a particular culture may consist in a way of life which is closely associated 
with territory and use of its resources. This may be particularly true of members of indigenous 
communities (…)” (quoted in Barume 2010: 51). Beyond pasture and water access, pastoralist 
communities typically require access to traditional medicines, sacred sites, initiation sites, salt 
licks, and burial sites (among other purposes).  
Barabaig pastoralists of Tanzania, for instance, who lost a large proportion of their lands (over 
100,000 hectares) to a state-owned, Canadian-funded wheat farming venture in 1968, tried to stop 
the appropriation of their land through testimonials by elders that appealed for consideration of the 
community’s ties to the grave sites of their ancestors. Particularly esteemed individuals, they 
explained, were not buried in the same manner as other community members but were interred in 
elaborate graves that took more than two years to construct (Barume 2010). Their pleas fell on deaf 
ears, the wheat scheme prevailed, the graves were bulldozed, and all of the Barabaig evicted. After 
the wheat farms failed, the Barabaig sued to reclaim their land (Lane 2006). However, they lost on 
a technicality: their inability to provide documentary evidence of being “native” to Tanzania, 
despite it being a well-known fact that Barabaig are not found anywhere else (Tenga 2011). 
A recurring problem for pastoralist peoples in eastern Africa is the weak recognition of their 
customary rules and practices regarding land access, land use, and traditional law. While 
pastoralists were living in the areas well before modern state authorities arrived and were following 
time-honoured traditions of land- and resource use that helped them survive and even thrive, 
statutory state law often tends to overrule customary law, including dispute resolution mechanisms 
and redistribution rules. State authorities seem ill-equipped to conceptually and practically deal 
with open access and customary use and regulations of commonly-held pastoral lands, although 
they in principle recognise their value and relevance. Moreover, in states such as Tanzania, where 
land legislation requires land owners to demonstrate ‘use’ or run the risk of confiscation, 
pastoralists and hunter-foragers are disadvantaged since, unlike cultivators whose rows of planted 
maize or beans clearly index usage, pastoralist and hunting-gathering land use is often invisible, 
rendering their historical claims on the land precarious. Based on the Lockean principle that 
property emanates from the investment of labour, failure to break the soil leaves pastoralists and 
hunters seemingly without rights, despite centuries of land-use that in fact shaped the forest and 
savannah landscapes of eastern Africa. This agrarian bias in land tenure is intimately connected to 
the discourse of terra nullius, which defines lands exploited by mobile pastoralists or shifting 
cultivators as if they were “empty” waiting for capitalist redemption (Makki 2014).  
Future development and national policy toward pastoralists might pay more attention to the 
positive aspects of customary pastoral land use. This would also help prevent armed clashes 
between local pastoralists not informed about national state law that is proclaimed “applicable” to 
their lands or about new investment schemes that are introduced without their knowledge or 
without their having been consulted. Unfortunately, needlessly violent clashes between state forces 
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and pastoralists have occurred across eastern Africa over the past years. From what we know from 
field research, pastoralists are, however, not against new socio-economic developments (see e.g. 
Gabbert 2012: 222ff), but like any citizen would like to be informed and be made partners to them 
– and have rights thereto, in accordance with constitutional principles and national law.  
Indeed, pastoralists have tried time and again to secure or reclaim their land rights in courts of 
law. For the most part, due to bias within the court systems against pastoralist livelihoods and due 
to lack of access to quality legal representation, these efforts have been mired in failure. Take, for 
example, the “Masai Case of 1913” documented by Lotte Hughes (2006) in which Purko Maasai 
were forcibly relocated in 1911 from their territory in northern Kenya to arid plains in the south 
and who took their case to court but lost due to technicalities that today seem astonishing. And 
recently, commanding international attention, was the case of Loliondo in Tanzania’s Ngorongoro 
District, where Maasai, who had suffered expulsion in 1959 from their territory in what is now the 
Serengeti National Park, in 2013 faced relocation and reduction of their pastures to accommodate a 
private Arab hunting concession. The allocation of 1,500 sq km of pastoralist lands was insisted on 
by the government in direct violation of rights held by eight Maasai villages whose official 
registration was established through the surveying and certification of their boundaries (Renton 
2009). However, an international campaign waged primarily in the media against the evictions, 
which secured nearly two million online signatures, has secured an apparent reversal of policy by 
the government. Two recent Maasai land cases achieved legal victories in Tanzania, both at the 
highest court in the land – the Court of Appeal (Askew et al. 2013) – but these have remained 
hollow victories: the government argues it lacks funds to evict the illegal farmers occupying 
Maasai lands, even as every day it initiates new ‘operations’ to evict pastoralists from areas newly 
designated as exclusively agricultural. 
The trend away from mixed purpose land use, whereby farmers and pastoralists shared access to 
the land in seasonal turn, towards exclusive agricultural use is driven largely by foreign investors, 
who expect and want to be assured of exclusive access. Unfortunately, it is often the case that “the 
current wave of FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] flows and land acquisitions is taking place in 
contexts where many people have only insecure land rights – which makes them vulnerable to 
dispossession.” (Cuffaro and Hallam 2011: 7)  The authors add that:  
 
“[o]ne common characteristic of countries targeted for large scale acquisitions is the fact that 
the state ‘owns’ large amounts of land, and such land, even if occupied by traditional users, 
is easily transferred to outsiders, often in less than fully transparent ways. Respecting land 
and resource rights would require, according to FAO et al. (2010) a systematic process of 
recognition and demarcation of land rights, which, it is argued, is much preferable to the 
identification of land rights on a case by case basis; use of expropriation strictly 
circumscribed and with prompt and fair compensation (…); clear and transparent 
mechanisms to transfer land rights, since many countries dispose of public land in an ad hoc 
way that can be source of corruption and patronage.” (Cuffaro and Hallam 2011: 10f) 
 
There is a pressing need for the development of modern state policies in eastern Africa to reassess 
and fundamentally recognise the customary arrangements and rules in pastoral economies that give 
people the right and the opportunity to make a living and secure their future livelihoods. A 
substantial body of research (for a few examples, see Abdulahi 2007; Ahmed and Yared 2008; 
Bekele 2008, 2010; Dessalegn 2011; Pavanello and Levine 2011; PFP 2010; Watson 2003) is 
available to draw upon for the constructive incorporation of locally relevant customary rules and 
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practices in future development initiatives for pastoralist groups. Such acceptance would not only 
be granted on the basis of the human- and land rights of those affected, but also out of recognition 
of the economic contributions that pastoralists and hunter-gatherers make to national economies, a 
fact frequently forgotten in the rush to attract the tantalising if elusive profits promised by global 
agro-industrial corporations.9 
 
The Sedentarisation, Displacement, and Resettlement of Pastoralists  
 
The large-scale acquisition of land by states and investors usually promises benefits to farmers, 
forest-dwellers, or pastoralists who are often forcibly settled or displaced. However, these benefits 
are rarely enjoyed by those who pay the price for such top-down initiatives. Sedentarisation has 
long been the standard formula for ‘development’ of the pastoral sector the world over. This also 
applies to the Greater Horn of Africa. The settlement of pastoralists in agriculture-based villages is 
seen as the panacea for the perceived problems of water and pasture scarcity in semi-arid areas ill-
suited to rain-fed agriculture, despite the often adequate adaptation pattern of pastoralists vis-à-vis 
their difficult environment. That the difficulties for pastoralists have increased in many areas 
cannot be denied (e.g. in Sudan, Chad, Somalia, or Kenya), but the reasons for it usually are: the 
encroachment of agriculture and commercial farming on some of the few well-watered areas of arid 
lands indispensable for pastoral land use, and the stripping of resources from pastoral areas without 
sharing arrangements. 
Pastoralists are usually described as ‘poor’ and ‘food-insecure’. Although many periodically are 
(while many are not), they would not necessarily become wealthy and food-secure if they were 
induced to go over to cultivation. In their volume As Pastoralists Settle, Fratkin and Roth (2005) 
show, for example, that one of the consequences of sedentarisation on the health and well-being of 
pastoralist populations in northern Kenya is poorer nutrition (see ibid. chapters 6–11). 
Sedentarisation based on static agriculture is not a one-size-fits-all solution to the challenges of all 
pastoral peoples, but reflects a governmental preference for attaining better control over them, and 
privileging other actors. Besides, many pastoralists, for example in southern Ethiopia, already 
successfully practice cultivation, e.g. along river banks and fields in the higher altitudes (via 
shifting cultivation). These existing practices should be built upon in developmental policy.  
The forced displacement of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the name of national development 
and nation-building is a source of recurring instability and upheaval. Considered as a worldwide 
category, people displaced and resettled because of development projects (including dam building, 
irrigation development, urban clearances, and road building) share three main characteristics. First, 
they are surprisingly numerous – on average at least 15 million a year or 300 million over the past 
twenty years (Cernea and Mathur 2008: 20). If we were to add those who have not been physically 
displaced from their homes but who have lost access to land and other resources as a result of 
development projects, the numbers would undoubtedly increase. 
Second, they are disproportionately members of ethnic minorities and therefore tend to be 
economically disadvantaged and politically marginalised. For example, fifty per cent of those 
                                                            
9 Valuable contributions to these discussions are made by several organisations, networks, and institutions such as the 
Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC), Land Deal Politics Initiative (LDPI), International Livestock Research Institute 
(ILRI), Sustainable Use of Natural Resources & Peace in Pastoralist Areas in Africa (SUNARPA), Pastoralist Forum 
Ethiopia (PFE), Oakland Institute, Land Matrix, LANDac, International Land Coalition, GRAIN, Human Rights Watch, 
Contested Global Landscapes, International Rivers, and Survival International.   
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displaced by the Narmada Dam, in Gujarat Province of northwestern India, belonged to ‘tribal’ 
populations, who account for only eight per cent of the total Indian population. Commenting on 
this, Indian author Arundhati Roy, who has been a vigorous campaigner on behalf of those 
displaced by the Narmada Dam, writes: “The ethnic otherness of their victims takes some pressure 
off the Nation Builders. It’s like having an expense account. Someone else pays the bills. People 
from another country. Another world. India’s poorest people are subsidizing the lifestyles of her 
richest.” (Roy 1999: 18f)  
Third, those displaced by development projects are typically, if paradoxically, made worse off by 
the projects that displace them. Hence, one question that draws the most attention in the literature 
is: why do those who are forced to move by development projects generally become worse off as a 
result, despite the explicit and well-meaning intention of project planners to achieve exactly the 
opposite result? Fratkin et al. (2004) found in northern Kenya that the under-nine-year-old children 
of settled Ariaal Rendille were three times more malnourished than those living in livestock-
keeping, mobile communities, which was attributed to the latter group’s access to dairy animals. 
Furthermore, Rendille women living in settled farming communities on Mount Marsabit were 
seasonally more malnourished than their nomadic counterparts, due to both poorer foods and a 
higher workload (Fujita et al. 2005).  
Someone, who has probably done more than anyone to help us understand the ‘impoverishment 
risks’ of forced displacement and how they can be avoided or mitigated, is the anthropologist 
Michael Cernea, formerly of the World Bank and the principal architect of its “Involuntary 
Resettlement Guidelines”. His article The Risk and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced 
Populations (1997) must be the single most quoted source in the literature on development-forced 
displacement.10 Another much discussed and closely related topic is the role and significance of 
resistance to forced displacement. Here, one thinks of the work of another anthropologist, Antony 
Oliver-Smith – especially his book Defying Displacement: grassroots resistance and the critique of 
development (2010). Several ongoing ethno-regional insurgent movements in northeastern Africa 
have their roots in the resistance of pastoral societies to state impositions and land loss.  
It is surprising that the discussion of the future of pastoralism in Africa generally makes little use 
of the abundant research literature that now exists on development-forced displacement and 
resettlement – not least surprising because anthropologists have been such major contributors to 
both bodies of literature. Cernea begins his 1997 article by describing impoverishment as the 
“central risk” faced by development-displaced people everywhere and as a “major pathology of 
development”. He goes on to break down the risk of impoverishment into eight principal 
components, his point being that we know, from a “vast social science and policy literature” (ibid.: 
1570), that some or all of these risks will attach, in varying degrees, to any project involving forced 
displacement. Those which are most relevant to the forced displacement of pastoralists – whether, 
for example, by national parks or large-scale agricultural development and irrigation schemes – are 
(1) loss of access to common property resources, including land; (2) economic and social 
marginalisation; (3) food insecurity and malnutrition; (4) increased morbidity and mortality; and 
(5) loss of the social support mechanisms people had previously relied on during times of hardship.  
                                                            
10  See also his more recent edited book (with Hari Mohan Mathur) Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? 
Reforming resettlement through investment and benefit sharing (2008), in which he clearly states that compensation is 
not enough. 
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These risks can all be guarded against, argues Cernea, and forced displacement and resettlement 
can be turned into a “development opportunity” for the displaced, if the lessons to be learnt from 
this “vast (...) literature” are taken to heart. He stresses three points in particular. First, planners 
should take special measures, targeted at each one of the predicted impoverishment risks rather 
than being “general and vague in their ‘planning’” (ibid.: 1577). Second, there must be, from the 
start, effective communication between the planners and those to be displaced. This includes 
providing full information about the causes and impacts of displacement and ensuring the genuine 
participation of the affected population in finding acceptable solutions. And third, compensation 
alone will never be enough to enable the re-establishment of family and community because the 
costs borne by the affected population are bound to exceed the costs of the physical losses 
involved. Long-term benefit sharing is therefore necessary. 
A good example of how not to go about the displacement and resettlement of pastoralists is 
provided by the river-basin development in Ethiopia’s Omo Valley. The Omo has long been seen 
as a river with an excellent hydropower and irrigation potential. It has been estimated, for example, 
that, once the river’s highly seasonal flow has been regulated by hydropower dams in its upper and 
middle basins, over 50,000 ha. will become available in its lower basin for reliable large-scale 
irrigation development (Woodroofe et al. 1996). In fact, the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation has now 
begun developing an area more than three times this size, in anticipation of the completion, by 
2015, of the Gibe III hydropower dam. Known as the “Kuraz Sugar Development Project”, this will 
eventually equal the entire area currently irrigated in Kenya. Thousands of agro-pastoralists are 
already being evicted, by government fiat, from their most valuable agricultural land along the 
banks of the Omo. The evictions are being accompanied by a resettlement or “villagisation” 
programme that, although described as voluntary, is forced in the sense that those affected have no 
reasonable option but to comply. To our knowledge, no environmental impact assessments or 
feasibility studies have been published. We are also unaware of any plans to compensate those who 
have lost their agricultural land along the banks of the Omo, let alone to set up targeted long-term 
programmes of benefit sharing and livelihood reconstruction (see also Makki 2014: 91; Imeru 
2010: 13ff). And it is clear that no attempt has been made to give the affected population a genuine 
say in decision-making.11 
In short, none of the lessons identified by Cernea from the research and policy literature on 
development-forced displacement and resettlement have been learnt in this case. On the contrary, 
the planning process has been entirely top-down and implementation has been surrounded by a wall 
of secrecy. So far from genuinely consulting the affected population, strenuous efforts have been 
made, with the help of police and army units, to intimidate them into compliance with government 
wishes and to prevent them from talking about the project to outsiders, especially foreigners. The 
planners apparently believe that the affected people will automatically benefit from generalised 
economic development and ‘modern’ forms of agriculture. It even seems to be assumed that the 
agro-pastoralists of the Lower Omo will be better off after resettlement, however they manage to 
survive and whether they realise this at the moment or not, because they will have been lifted out of 
the ‘backwardness’ of their former lives as mobile herders. Unfortunately, everything we have 
                                                            
11 “Naturally, there was resistance to the project from the indigenous ethnic groups. This resistance, according to project 
officials and Wereda and Zone Administrators, is attributed to the ‘lack of awareness’ and ‘backward culture’ of the 
indigenous people (…). As a result, the direction taken to (…) lower the extent of resistance was an extensive and 
intensive campaign of discussions, with the objective of making them accept the decision that came up from way above.” 
(Tewolde and Fana 2013: 8) 
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learnt from fifty years of research on the consequences of development-forced displacement, as 
well as from the sorry history of so-called ‘pastoral development’ in Africa and elsewhere, tells us 
that this expectation, however sincerely held, is a delusion. If irrigation development and 
resettlement in the Lower Omo continues on its present course, it is virtually certain that it will 
become known as a text-book example of how not to do river-basin development (Turton 2012) 
and as a “disgracing stain on development itself.” (Cernea and Mathur 2008: 1) 
 
Cooperative Development and Codes of Conduct for Responsible Investment 
 
To address the challenges described above, there are numerous well-known ‘guidelines’ and ‘codes 
of conduct’ that aim at good governance on land investments.12 They have different foci but most 
refer to the same principles to protect land rights, human rights, environment and social and ethnic 
integrity. Cuffaro and Hallam (2011: 11) state that among these principles the recognition of 
existing rights to land and associated natural resources as well as transparency are key to 
environmental rights, labour rights, and human rights performance of investors and should be both 
mandatory in investors’ home countries as well as in the host countries. One problem is that none 
of the guidelines are internationally binding, which is especially difficult in a globalised setting that 
provides niches of unethical behaviour for national and multinational enterprises. In addition to 
this, codes of conduct, in spite of their points of convergence, have been criticised for being used to 
‘harness’ and legitimise unethical land deals and therefore to provide quick fixes to criticism and 
failure instead of addressing the larger problems of land acquisition (see Borras and Franco 2010; 
Evers et al. 2013; The Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform Land Research Action Network 
2010).13 Serious social and environmental impact assessments cannot be misused as a wild card for 
investment in land. Instead, they should be part of a comprehensive approach to cooperative and 
equitable development. This implies that investments that cannot meet certain standards should not 
be made. The option to retreat must remain viable, especially if there are legitimate social, ethical, 
economic, or pragmatic reasons, e.g. evidence that production standards cannot be met or that local 
communities do not benefit, are not involved in the process, or cannot agree after serious 
consultation (Gabbert 2013). 
Omitting the step of safeguarding principles by rushing agricultural investments can become 
counter-productive, as is the case with an increasing number of land deals that have been 
negatively labelled and criticised as “land-grabs” (e.g. White et al. 2012; Borras and Franco 2012). 
“Land grabbing” is characterised by the large size of the land investment, the lack of transparency 
of the negotiation and implementation of the investment, the incompleteness of contracts (Cuffaro 
and Hallam 2011), and missing involvement of the local communities who (used to) inhabit the 
land (see also Abbink 2011). With a growing global interest in land, accompanied by an emerging 
resistance to land deals or other investments that negatively qualify as “land grabs” on international 
platforms, the neglect of good practices might lead not only to regional but also to global conflict. 
Land deals that cannot prove that an ethical approach was taken or address CSR (corporate social 
responsibility) concerns will become increasingly risky for investors. As guidelines become more 
binding and court cases against land grabbing are rising in number, compensation payments and 
                                                            
12 E.g. Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect the Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (FAO et al. 
2010); Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa (African Union et al. 2010).  
13 For an overview of good governance initiatives and a critique, see Ismar (2013). 
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loss of reputation are lurking in the future for those investors failing to complete these crucial steps. 
For example, in Ecuador, the Sarayaku people of the Amazon recently filed a case against their 
government at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In 2012,  
 
“[t]he Court found the State responsible for violating rights of the community of Sarayaku, 
their ancestral lands and cultural identity, for not granting effective legal protection, and for 
having placed their life and personal integrity in danger in the presence of seismic explosives 
within their territory. Among the actions the Court stipulates for the Ecuadorian government 
are removal of the explosives, payment for damages, and consultation that meets 
international standards for any development projects that impact Sarayaku territory.” 
(Pachamana 2012, para. 2f) 
 
In this sense, efforts to establish good relations between investors, states, and local communities 
must become a routine part of the calculations for possible rewards in the decision-making process 
before investments are made. Securing respect for the observance of guidelines for responsible 
investment will depend on sound consultation procedures to establish genuine mutual 
communication between local populations, governments, and investors. Dereje (2013: 172) notes 
that the grounds for such a cooperative approach are laid out in, e.g. the Preamble of the 1995 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, which states that “the Constitution is based on the 
voluntary commitment of the Ethiopian ‘Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ to build a political 
community which ensures lasting peace, economic and social development through mutual support 
and mutual respect”. Increasingly, investment agencies apply these ideas in their analysis and 
consultancies. Yet, only time can tell whether and how these principles will be implemented, 
especially if consultation – with a price tag – must be seriously integrated into decision-making 
processes.14 One common objection to cooperation is that “investors are not charity agencies”. 
Indeed, cooperative efforts before and during a project should not be confounded with “charity” 
(see Morton 2013: 110). It cannot be sufficient engagement by a major investor to only donate an 
ambulance to a community (which indeed would be charity, not involvement), but moreover the 
notion of charity disregards the fact that input from agents and sources of local knowledge are 
valuable resources that should be acknowledged. If local expertise that has enabled people, like 
pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, to survive in harsh environments for centuries is merely regarded 
as “hindering a project” rather than informing it, the legitimacy of the project should again be 
reflected on, especially by policy makers. For instance, local-level authorities are often experts in 
managing natural resources. Referring to mistakes made in colonial settings, the economist Daniel 
Bromley (1991: 110) describes how changing land uses combined with the destruction of authority 
systems on village levels led to natural resource degradation by stakeholders who were 
insufficiently knowledgeable and accountable, in other words: interested only in short-term profit. 
In many pastoralist settings in eastern Africa it is not too late to avoid these mistakes made in other 
parts of the world. 
Additionally, if the integration of peripheral areas in education, health provision, and veterinary 
care as a valuable part of development plans is to be successful, the contribution of private 
investment to public resources needs to be well-coordinated. In this context, the comprehensive 
implementation of improvements for local populations as one promise of investment needs to be 
immediate, genuine, and be accounted for to prevent exploitative outcomes of land and other 
                                                            
14 “If the costs of sustainable and fair production are not economically viable, then perhaps the project should not be 
carried out” (Pangea 2011). Pangea (Partners for Euro-African Green Energy) promotes African bioenergy investments.  
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investments, a sell-out of resources, and a detrimental turn of win-win promises into scenarios of 
impoverishment both locally and nationally. In spite of the many obstacles to achieve socially 
sustainable principles of agricultural investment (see FAO et al. 2010), especially policy makers 
can play a vital part in creating opportunities for a re-definition of equitable investment in 
emerging African contexts and again prevent the repetition of mistakes made before in other 
regions of the world. Therefore, establishing ongoing communication about expectations, needs, 
and benefits between governments, investors, and local communities from the outset should 
become part and parcel of well-informed as well as the basis for well-functioning relationships 
(Gabbert 2013). 
One concrete way in which this can be done, as proposed by Ivo Strecker (2013), is to have all 
parties concerned adhering to an “International Investors Code of Conduct” (IICC) and jointly 
working out what kind of large-scale and small-scale projects are most appropriate in a given 
situation.  
 
“Things will go well when no one gets excluded from this process, neither those most 
directly involved like the investors, local populations, regional administrations and national 
governments, nor more remote parties like donor agencies, civil rights groups, the media and 
scholars (…) the International Investors Code of Conduct and the global attempts at more 
equitable development are intertwined. They are co-emerging and are two sides of a single 
process.” (Strecker 2013) 
 
Any attempt at furthering equitable development must take historical factors into account in order 
to generate positive models for intervention and investment that take historical experience into 
proper consideration. In Ethiopia, for example, this comprehensive approach would converge with 
the spirit of the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, which states in its preamble 
that “our common destiny can best be served by rectifying historically unjust relationships and by 
further promoting our shared interests”, a new political order imbued with fraternity and supported 
by acts of solidarity (Constitution of the FDRE 1995: Preamble).  
 
Conflict, Security Dimensions, and Inclusive Policies of Investment 
 
Civic rights of citizens in developing countries, including in eastern Africa, also comprise the 
pastoral peoples in “marginal” areas. Governments have issued constitutional injunctions and often 
also pastoral policy papers that pay attention to specific issues pertinent to this sector. Yet there is 
an observable disconnect between the agenda of developmental states and the rights, livelihood 
strategies and expectations of local communities (see Schoneveld and Maru 2014: 35; Asnake and 
Fana 2012: 127). 
If land is used, leased or taken without consent, resentment or even aggression can put a project 
at risk and can also lead to wider discontent. The political economy of land investment in the 
Gambella region sheds light on the potential for conflict generated by the new land enclosures and 
the increasing sense of economic exclusion by local communities. Dereje (2013: 183) describes 
how “virtual monopolies” of highlanders in the peripheral areas of Ethiopia have “created an 
explosive mix between class and identity, fuelling tension between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ – one of 
the conflict-generating factors in the peripheral areas.” In these cases those perceived as ‘settlers’ 
are not just foreigners but include Ethiopian investors who come from highland areas close to the 
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capital city, Addis Ababa, and who are politically more influential and more highly educated than 
those from ‘peripheral’ areas. At the same time, lack of good governance observed in foreign 
investments fuels more ‘peripheral discontent’. Two major incidents that occurred in the western 
region of Gambella where large-scale commercial agriculture is most advanced can be taken as a 
precursor for the huge potential for conflict induced by large-scale land enclosures. In the attack on 
the 10,000 hectare, Saudi-owned rice farm in Abobo woreda (administrative unit) in April 2012, 
five people were killed, four Ethiopians and one Pakistani, and eight others suffered injuries. All of 
the victims of the attack were employees of the Saudi Star Agricultural Business. The Ethiopian 
National Defence Forces retaliated by raiding the neighbouring villages for allegedly cooperating 
with the attackers. The incident that occurred in the Majang Zone, Godere woreda, Gambella 
region, in October 2013 is an illustrative case of how the local communities’ sense of economic 
exclusion and environmental concerns could translate into deadly confrontations. Residents of 
Godere woreda attacked and set on fire the property of an Indian-owned commercial farm on 
account of destroying the rich forest resources in the woreda where the company has acquired 
some 5,000 hectares of land for tea plantation. Verdanta took over the plantation five years ago 
from the Ministry of Agriculture on a 50-year lease contract at a fairly low cost. The vigilantes 
attacked the plantation compound and set ablaze stores, fuel tankers, tractors, excavators, and 
timber, allegedly harvested from the land the company used for tea plantation. Residents of the area 
consider the land to be a forest resource. In fact, it is among the 58 primary national forest regions 
in the country. However, tea plantation requires the entire vegetation to be cleared from the area. 
Following the incident the regional and zonal governments took punitive measures against what 
they considered the ‘ring leaders’ of this ‘anti-development’ act. A lack of corporate social 
responsibility has compounded the problem. For example, the Saudi-owned company in Gambella, 
as is the case elsewhere in the country, has yet to win the hearts and minds of the local population 
by actively engaging in providing social services or creating employment opportunities. In fact, the 
encroachment into the villages despite the investment agreement (the establishment of the farms in 
nine km distance from the villages) has created mistrust and animosity between the investors and 
the local population. The Indian-based global commercial farm company Karuturi and its 
relationship with local communities is another case in point. Karuturi’s burning of the post-harvest 
maize leftover in February 2013, despite the community’s insistence to make use of it, has raised 
the question of moral integrity and social responsibility of large-scale investors. Such blatant 
disregard strained relationships between local communities and foreign investors, who seek 
protection from government security units instead of building ties with the local communities, as 
indicated by the armed vehicles that carry the personnel of the commercial farms to and from 
Gambella town. Dereje states:  
 
“The Ethiopian Federation needs to invest much more in the economic capacity-building of 
people of the periphery in the spirit of solidarity and fraternity that it has evinced in other 
domains of social life such as education and the introduction of an equitable budget 
formula.” (Dereje 2013: 184) 
 
If conflicts arising from development and investment policies are to be prevented, one of the major 
challenges will be how to achieve solidarity and national cooperation. In other words, if local 
people cannot identify with land politics, the conflict potential of these enterprises increases. If land 
is taken in non-transparent ways without returns being locally enjoyed or if decisions about 
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economy and cultural identities are more or less forced upon people, resentment will inevitably 
feed unrest or resistance. If people dislike or resent a project, it will not work to its fullest economic 
and social capacity. Safety measures and maintenance of security will become costly, local support 
will be undermined and neighbourly relations that are so important will become tense or even 
hostile.  
Mutually achieved consent supported by local populations remains an obvious crucial factor for 
the positive integration, long-term acceptance, and success of projects, whereas the lack thereof is 
one of the main obstacles for the peaceful operation of large-scale land projects. More and more 
(foreign) investors have also expressed a preference for mutually cooperative initiatives.  
Lewis et al. (2008) show how sensitive the subject is. In case studies in the Congo Basin they 
describe that people distinguish qualities of consent between “acceptance of one’s own will”, 
“acceptance because of weariness of the debate”, “acceptance because of obligation”, and 
“acceptance with a later lack of promised return”. Lewis et al. (2008: 23) also show that the term 
“consent”, e.g. in the European understanding, is “[a] definitive agreement (…) made at a specific 
moment in time”, whereas “consent” in the Congo Basin context depicts “[a]n ongoing relationship 
of exchange between parties which undergoes revision and renegotiation”. This is not surprising 
and comes close to the dynamics that mark every new neighbourly relationship, in which terms of 
cooperation and understanding have to be developed from scratch. Acceptance of and identification 
with changes is always difficult (see Schlee 2013). Much can be gained by applying respectful 
attitudes in any human encounter, which demonstrate the acceptance of both customary and 
statutory law. This commonplace is also meaningful for all stages of investment projects being 
implemented on pastoral territory. The question of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) before 
investments in land are made is not only a formal procedure, but an effort that signalises the will 
for inclusiveness and respectful cooperation in the future. Projects that can rely on mutual consent 
avoid many of the risks carried by projects that lack such cooperation (Gabbert 2013). In this 
respect, inclusive development policies can contribute significantly to reduce the conflict potential 
of change; an inclusive policy is one in which the decision makers identify sufficiently with those 
affected by their policies that they will diligently keep the interests of the latter in mind. If 
governments do not just react to pressure from below and from outside but also have an image of 
themselves that they want others to accept, this could encourage them to try to escape from the trap 
of identifying, and being identified, with narrow interests and, thus, being rejected by large 
segments of their own people. The members of such a government might amass somewhat fewer 
riches, but their lives and property would be much safer, and one can assume that they would feel 
much better. The costs just might be balanced by the benefits (Schlee 2013). Inclusive policies do 
not just pay lip service but provide feed-back on the process by helping to find solutions to 
combining pastoralism and agriculture in economically sound and regionally specific ways as in 
the following examples: 
Cotton can be browsed by livestock after harvest. After the extraction of oil from the cotton 
seeds, the remainder can be pressed into cotton seed cake, a valuable animal feed. When cane is 
harvested, the upper parts of the plants can be used as animal fodder. After the juice has been 
squeezed out of the lower parts of the plants, the fibrous remainders are good filling material for 
animal fodder. They are not very nutritious, but the large stomach of a ruminant needs a lot of 
substance to fill it. The energy would have to come from another source. This source can be 
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molasses, the part of the juice which remains after extracting as much sugar as possible and is still 
very sweet.  
In Sudan, land owners who have given part of their land to sugar plantations receive a rent and 
possibly special deals on by-products of agricultural production for their animals. There is no 
reason not to try similar measures in other countries, aiming to transform irrigated lands in the 
vicinity of the rivers into a factor enhancing pastoralism rather than causing its destruction. One 
would need to grant the pastoralists and their herds access to watering points at the river and at 
irrigation canals and to replace the seasonal grazing resources they lose by offering them special 
deals and giving them privileged access to crop residues and by-products of industrial production.  
 
Historical Models as Lessons for Meaningful Engagement:  
an example from the Awash Valley 
 
The Awash Valley provides a historical example of the conversion of pastoralist land to large-scale 
irrigated crop production (see also Behnke and Kerven 2013a, b). The case of the Awash River 
Basin development, which dates back to the days of Emperor Haile Selassie, may serve as a model 
for other river valleys bordered by alluvial plains in Northeast Africa. Comparable changes are 
taking place under our eyes in the Lower Omo area in southern Ethiopia (Fratkin 2014), in the Tana 
River delta in Kenya (Nunow 2013), and along the Blue Nile in Sudan. In the Awash Valley, large-
scale irrigation schemes dedicated to commercial agriculture were initiated in imperial times 
(before the revolution of 1974) and subsequently led to a number of problems, which have also 
later occurred in other cases and are likely to occur in future development projects in river basins 
unless planners learn from the past. The Awash River development may serve here as a 
paradigmatic case, since it is well documented over time. Already in the 1970s, it had become clear 
that the kind of development pursued in the Awash Valley would neither benefit the local Afar nor 
large numbers of ordinary Ethiopians but only a coalition of foreign companies and local 
dignitaries. “[B]ecause capital and know-how has come from abroad (Britain, Israel, USA, Holland 
and Italy) many of the holdings in the Valley are typical neo-colonialist enterprises which do little 
to help either the Afar or the people of Ethiopia as a whole.” (Flood15 1975: 6)  Some of the “costs” 
(in the diction of Behnke and Kerven 2013a, b) of this development had already been anticipated 
by the late Glynn Flood almost forty years ago: 
Increased inequality and risk of famine. Flood noted that the Great Famine of 1972/3 owed much 
to misconceived “development” (Flood 1975: 7). The importance of subsistence production, i.e. by 
which people feed themselves and their communities, is often neglected by planners, who 
exclusively focus on marketable surplus. Flood observed that “Ethiopia is an extremely poor 
country, though by no means as poor as figures published by the various agencies of the United 
Nations suggest. In the sense that a vast majority of Ethiopians are self-sufficient in their daily 
needs, Ethiopia might be termed very rich. The bulk of the nation’s imports are luxury goods, 
motor vehicles and machinery. Paradoxically, the result of development is the creation of a large 
dependent rural proletariat. And even if figures for per capita income increased over the years, it is 
                                                            
15 “Glynn Flood was an LSE [London School of Economics] doctoral student who argued in 1975 that the Ethiopian 
government’s agricultural schemes were ignoring the interests of a nomadic group, the Afar or Danakil, to the extent that 
they created a ‘man made famine’. (…) Flood was killed in the same year by Ethiopian soldiers in the course of their 
suppression of Afar dissidents.” (Benthall 2002: 6f) 
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probable that this reflects the growing accumulation of capital in a few hands rather than any 
general increase in prosperity” (Flood 1975: 8). 
Underutilisation of land not included in the irrigation schemes. “When a small area close to the 
river is made unavailable for dry season grazing, a much larger area away from the river is 
rendered useless” (Flood 1975: 7). “If the present type of development continues unchecked, the 
full utilization of the 200,000 irrigable hectares in the Awash Valley will leave many millions of 
hectares of desert and semi-desert totally under-utilized – for the only people or culture capable of 
exploiting such land will no longer exist.” (Flood 1975: 8) 
Deteriorating security. Violent responses by the nomads to what they perceived as an outside 
intrusion and a takeover of their land included “the destruction of surveyor’s marking posts and the 
burning of machinery” (Flood 1975: 7), in addition to forcing their way onto plantations to graze 
their herds on the crops. Apart from conflicts between farmers and herders (ibid.: 5), different 
groups of pastoralists also had violent clashes with each other, as groups lost their pastures and 
were forced to encroach on pastures traditionally belonging to other groups. As Afar lands began to 
be taken over by the Awash Valley Authority (AVA) in 1962, the relationship of the Afar to 
Oromo (Kerreyu and Ittu) and Argobba started to decline from a good neighbourly one, even 
characterised by intermarriage, to one of violent conflict (Rettberg 2010). 
Expulsion and replacement of populations. Some Afar engaged in irrigated agriculture 
themselves in order to protect their land from being taken over by others. Yet others found work as 
labourers, something which is often advertised as an advantage by planners who stress that local 
people may find employment on development schemes, but which may be regarded as a kind of 
downward mobility by people who were formerly independent farmers, agro-pastoralists, or 
nomadic livestock owners. Still, the general pattern was one of replacement of the former 
occupants of the lands by immigrants from other parts of the country. Flood concluded that 
development of the kind that had been going on during this period, and has continued since, would 
not benefit the local people, would marginally benefit migrants from elsewhere and would not 
benefit the country as a whole. In his prophetic, concluding paragraph we read:  
 
“If the present situation continues, most of the capital amassed in these enterprises will leave 
Ethiopia, and the ordinary workers on the farms will maintain a ‘standard of living’ slightly 
higher than most Ethiopians at the expense of becoming dependent seasonal labourers 
migrating from the Highlands for harvest times. The original ‘nomads’ will have been 
replaced by modern wage-labourer nomads.” (Flood 1975: 9) 
 
What Behnke and Kerven (2013a,b) have found 38 years later confirms much of this scepticism. 
On the basis of his studies in the same region, Getachew (2001) came up with a similar list of 
“costs” or negative impacts of misconceived development.  
 
“[T]he results of such policies have been resource scarcity, resource conflicts, herd loss and 
to drive pastoralists to poverty and dependency on food aid, and settlement in and around 
towns, rather than to improve their lives as pastoralists.” (Getachew 2001: 117) 
 
The sedentarist bias of development policies that shines through in the policies criticised by 
Getachew, in spite of decades of scholarly writing against it, is still widespread (cf. Schlee 2012: 
1ff; Krätli 2006). Future development-oriented research should make use of the case of the Awash 
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Valley and derive a kind of checklist of things that might go wrong in comparable projects (Schlee 
2013). 
The Afar case shows how the control over one form of land use and one predominant export, in 
this case sugar, are the impetus for many internal conflicts and corrupt political hoarding of wealth. 
That is, so long as agribusiness-for-export models do not benefit the most vulnerable population in 
the supply chain, the outcome will be far from equitable. As Strecker shows for the Woyto Valley 
(Strecker 2013), conflict is not inevitable if the basic maxims of equitable development, such as 
respecting customary land and water rights and integrating local expertise into collaborative land 
use models, are followed. 
While the Afar historical model embraces a kind of all-or-nothing attitude, i.e. that pastoralism 
and sugar cane are “mutually exclusive” forms of land use, a model of collaboration could be of 
great importance when it comes to planning and realising equitable development objectives 
(Strecker 2013). As these crucial historical examples show, only by meaningfully engaging 
pastoralists or agro-pastoralists as full partners in (and recipients of) development can equitable 
outcomes be achieved. Ideally, building equitable ventures that generate returns, employ people, 
revitalise communities, and integrate pastoralist economic systems into agro-commercial projects 
are the key methods to secure the future of pastoralists. 
 
Models for Equitable Development 
 
In the light of what we have said, we would like to make the following recommendations:  
 
1) Local communities, local level authorities, and traditional knowledge should be seriously 
integrated and consulted when developing environmentally sound approaches to managing 
natural resources with a long-term perspective. 
2) Local people affected by newly implemented projects should meet on a regular basis with 
administrators, investors, practitioners, and researchers (anthropologists, historians, 
geographers, biologists, economists, legal experts, etc.) to jointly discuss how traditional 
forms of production may be fruitfully and sustainably combined with modern industrial 
farming and other forms of investment. 
3) Sustainable pathways should involve the implementation of locally-inspired models of 
equitable development suitable for particular areas.  
4) Models, including everything from theoretical to land-use change models, should aim at 
achieving synergetic effects. That is, they should combine both large-scale and small-scale 
projects in such a way that they mutually complement and support each other. Of particular 
interest are solutions that show how small-scale projects – often based on traditional know-
how – may make optimal and locally beneficial use of by-products generated by large-
scale projects. 
5) There are numerous other ways in which large-scale projects may spawn local 
entrepreneurship and help develop small-scale projects suitable for specific regions. To 
effectively design synergetic models, however, requires in-depth investigation and 
consultation with local communities and other stakeholders. 
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6) In combination with investment schemes, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
programmes should be generated in close collaboration with local communities to develop 
and redefine CSR in African and in specific local contexts. 
7) As a first step to equitable development we recommend a research and action programme, 
which should bring together the expertise of local people, researchers, government and 




Concluding Remarks  
 
As members of the Lands of the Future Research Network, our intention is to convey that it is 
necessary and in the interest of all stakeholders to integrate pastoralist expertise into development 
models. Alienation of pastoralists from productive lands is unwarranted, unproductive, and 
unadvisable. That pastoralists in eastern Africa will be increasingly drawn into larger economic and 
social networks of exchange seems clear, as this has already occurred. But this process works best 
when agro-pastoralists are engaged by policy-makers, analysts, and investors, who recognise their 
productive and socio-cultural potential, their agency, and their commitment. Agro-pastoralist 
groups want to be partners in such wider processes, but also to retain the knowledge, skills, 
environmental resources, and socio-economic fall-back structures on which they have long 
depended.  
In reassessing (agro-) pastoralism, countries would do well to capitalise on the assets and the 
diversity these communities already have, all of which are adapted to African geo-physical and 
economic conditions. It would be strange to emulate Western developmental models (cf. Clapham 
2006) if these were to devalue time-tried strategies of pastoralism adapted to tropical conditions 
that have the unique potential to allow people and local authorities to develop new and inventive 
ways of building structures of agrarian-herding coexistence and to respond to the opportunities 
offered by their countries’ ecological-geographical diversity. Pastoralism, part of the historically 
evolved pattern of socio-economic diversity found in eastern African societies, is not by definition 
a ‘sad state’ that has to be abolished. In fact, as home to Africa’s largest population of domestic 
livestock, the production of Ethiopia’s pastoralists represents one of its greatest resources, 
contributing in important ways both to its domestic food security and its export incomes.  
In this paper we have shared a number of constructive critiques with regard to the neglect and 
lack of recognition of the productive contributions of pastoralists, to the foreseen costs and sources 
of conflict, and to development-generated displacement and loss of pastoral economies and 
cultures. Based on a positive assessment of their socio-cultural and material resources, we have 
proposed models and policies that would expedite the integration of pastoralism into market 
economies and the wider society. These observations and recommendations are intended to 
stimulate a constructive dialogue between the different ‘stakeholders’ and experts in order to work 
towards research- and reflection-based joint solutions to the challenges of change, investment, and 
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